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Abstract 
In recent years, as the definition of autism has expanded to include a ―spectrum‖ of disorders 
(ASDs), the prevalence of ASDs have increased drastically – from 4 to 10 per 10,000 children 
in the early 1990s to 30 to 50 per 10,000, or about 1%, in the 2000s. In order to address this 
problem, several state-level programs have been started and made available to any child with 
an ASD diagnosis. One such program, the Ohio Autism Scholarship Program (ASP), started 
providing up to $20,000 per year for families with formally-diagnosed ASD children to purchase 
services at any program-approved facility in 2004. The literature finds that programs relying on 
an ASD diagnosis for funding or services have the ability to influence diagnostic conclusions. 
This analysis builds upon these largely observational studies by quantifying the impact of 
one such diagnosis-dependent autism resource – the Ohio ASP - on autism rates. Currently, 
Ohio ASP funding can be utilized in roughly half of Ohio counties where approved providers 
exist. In order to determine whether changes in autism rates are attributable to the Ohio ASP, I 
perform both state and Ohio county difference-in-difference regression analyses controlling for 
general autism trends over time. At this time, it appears that the impact of the ASP on autism  
rates is insignificant or inconclusive. This is important to note for stakeholders who are 
concerned that such financial incentives may lead to false-ASD diagnoses and, in turn, strain the  
resources available for the children most in need of them. 
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Introduction 
  In 1956, Leo Kanner and Leon Eisenberg presented the first formal set of criteria for the 
diagnosis of autism. Since then, the concept of autism has broadened with the evolution of 
Rutter‘s three behavioral domains in 1978 and the subsequent uses of the terms ―Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder‖ (PDD) and, more recently, the greater-encompassing ―Autism 
Spectrum Disorder‖ (ASD) (Blaxill, 2004). Autism itself is a PDD involving deficits in all three 
of Rutter‘s domains (communication, social skills, and repetitive behaviors or interests) before 
the age of 36 months (WHO, 1994; APA, 1994). Although the core definition of autism has 
remained relatively stable since these three domains were established, the widely used ―Autism 
Spectrum Disorders‖ now constitutes an array of conditions in addition to autism, including not 
otherwise specified PDDs (PDD-NOS) and a large list of related disorders such as Asperger‘s 
syndrome (about 14 to 19% of ASD population), childhood disintegrative disorder, and Rett‘s 
syndrome (Blaxill, 2004).  
As these significant changes in diagnostic criteria took place, the prevalence of autism 
increased drastically – from 4 to 10 per 10,000 children in the early 1990s to 30 to 50 per 10,000 
in the first half of this decade (Barbaresi et al., 2006) and shows no sign of plateauing (Hertz-
Pizziotto & Delwiche, 2009). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported an 
average of 1 in 110 children or 1% autism prevalence in 2006, with increases ranging from 27 to 
95 (with an average of 57) percent since 2002 among the 16 Autism and Developmental 
Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) network communities in the United States (2010). The ADDM 
Network sites obtained these estimates using data from health and education records of reporting 
communities, which comprise eight percent of the U.S. population of eight year olds (CDC, 
2010); the range that they obtained reflects the breadth of change in autism rates experienced by Wronski 6 
 
the communities. When concerned researchers questioned this increase they found that it not 
only coincided with the aforementioned broadening of diagnostic criteria, but with the increased 
availability of educational services and increased awareness of autism as well (Barbaresi et al., 
2006).  
One obvious question is: ―How much of this increase in autism is ‗real?‘‖ In their study 
of autism in California, Hertz-Pizziotto and Delwiche (2009) find that changes in diagnostic 
criteria, earlier ages at diagnosis, and the inclusion of milder cases explain, albeit not fully (2.2-, 
1.56-, and 1.24-fold increases in autism incidence, respectively, out of a total 7- to 8-fold 
incidence increase from 1990 to 2006) the observed increase in autism incidence. Differential 
migration, or leaving the state due to an autism diagnosis, only played a minor or nonexistent 
role. They conclude with a call for further research in order to clarify the extent to which a 
continued rise in the incident rate represents a true increase in the occurrence of autism (Hertz-
Pizziotto & Delwiche, 2009).  
This study examines the role that newly-introduced increases in services and incentives 
for diagnoses play in inflating the prevalence of autism. First, I examine the impact of the unique 
Ohio Autism Scholarship Program (ASP) on the rates of autism at the state level using Ohio, 
nearby states, and all other ―far‖ states as comparison groups. Next, I examine the impact of the 
ASP on the rates of autism within Ohio, where the program is in effect to varying degrees by 
county depending on program provider availability. This analysis is substantiated by Shattuck 
and Grosse‘s (2007) reports of research which found that programs (like Ohio‘s), which use an 
ASD diagnosis to determine eligibility for funding or services, have the potential to influence 
clinical diagnostic conclusions.  Wronski 7 
 
Literature Review   
  Below I detail the literature identifying pre-natal parental factors, post-natal childhood 
environmental factors, and external societal factors as potential causes for the rise in autism 
rates. The consensus is that while autism is a debilitating disorder, there are promising, albeit 
expensive, services available which can improve the outcomes of children as long as they have a 
diagnosis of autism. As such, the literature shows that parents and physicians have an incentive 
to obtain a formal autism diagnosis for their child. The ASP in Ohio, which I discuss, is one such 
way services and autism diagnoses have been linked to create an incentive for diagnosis and 
potentially contribute to some of the increase in autism rates.  
Causes of Autism 
  I. Pre-Natal Factors  
  Before two people even decide to have a baby, there are several environmental factors 
that can place them at a higher risk of parenting an autistic child. Low socioeconomic status, 
high mother and/or father age, and parental schizoid traits have been identified as such potential 
factors (Larsson et al., 2005; Kelly, 2009). More proximally to conception and delivery, genetic 
abnormalities (Dombeck & Reynolds, 2006), fetal neurotoxins (Newschaffer et al., 2002), 
maternal illness (Chess, 1977), low age and/or birthweight (Larsson et al., 2005), and breech 
presentation (Bilder et al., 2009) have also been associated with autism.  
II. Post-Natal Environmental Factors 
Perhaps one of the most contentious and hard-to-research areas explores the impact of 
environmental determinants like loneliness and staying indoors on the development of autism. Wronski 8 
 
Lasgaard et al. (2010) found that the occurrence of loneliness is high among adolescent boys 
with ASD and suggests perceived social support as an important protective factor. Another 
study, by Waldman et al. (2008), used precipitation rates as a proxy for staying indoors and 
found that county-level autism prevalence rates and counts among school-aged children were 
positively associated with a county‘s mean annual precipitation. The same authors, using natural 
experiments in a separate study, found support for the hypothesis that early childhood television-
watching is a trigger for autism. 
Factors Influencing ASD Reporting Rates 
Croen et al. (2002) address the issue that is central to this study: Whether the observed 
increase in prevalence of ASD reflects a true increase in incidence or if it is an artifact of 
improved recognition and detection combined with a broadening of the diagnostic definition 
and expanding social services to meet the needs of ASD children. They examined the impact of 
external societal factors, such as increased services and ASD awareness, improvements in case 
recognition and diagnostic changes, on autism prevalence in California and concluded that these 
factors may indeed account for the observed increase in autism prevalence in the state. The 
researchers provide the example of how intensive autism intervention programs, such as the 
behavioral treatment program developed by Lovaasin 1987 which became more widely 
available during the early 1990s, gave families an incentive to enter the service delivery system 
in order to gain financial support for costly behavioral interventions. Croen et al. (2002) assert 
that ―in an era when other disorders in the autistic spectrum became more widely recognized 
and interventions became more available, pressure may have increasingly been put on the 
system to give children with Asperger‘s disorder and PDD-NOS a diagnosis of full syndrome 
autism so that they could qualify for regional center services‖ (p. 214).  Wronski 9 
 
Implications of Autism and Treatment Options 
There are significant financial costs involved in the treatment of autism. Ganz (as cited 
in Datz, 2006) estimates that the annual indirect costs for autistic individuals and their parents 
range from more than $39,000 to nearly $130,000. It is currently estimated the average cost of 
caring for one person with autism for life is $3.2 million (Vanderbilt, 2009). Moreover, autism 
currently costs the U.S. more than $90 billion per year, and that cost is projected to double by 
2017 due to the growing population of those affected (Vanderbilt, 2009). 
  One of the most promising treatment options for children with autism or PDD is early 
intensive intervention based on the principles of applied behavior analysis (ABA); normal or 
near-normal functioning or significant gains in measured intelligence or other aspects of 
development have been attributed to this type of intervention (Jacobson et al., 1998). 
Significant savings have been attributed to early intensive behavioral intervention (EIBI). At 
varying rates of effectiveness and in constant dollars, Jacobson et al. (1998) found that lifetime 
cost savings ranged from $187,000 to $203,000 per child for ages 3 to 22 years, and from 
$656,000 to $1,082,000 per child for ages 3 to 55 years in 1998. Indeed, among limited studies 
of various ASD therapies, expensive EIBI showed improved outcomes for some children 
(Caronna & Halfon, 2003). Nevertheless, children with autism require lifelong care, services, 
and supervision. Educational services for autistic children are among the most intensively 
staffed and expensive forms of special education available under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (Jacobson et al., 1998).  
The national Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) helps to remedy the 
immense family financial burden of autism by establishing Part C (P.L. 108-446) to provide an 
Early Intervention Program for infants and toddlers with disabilities and behavioral problems Wronski 10 
 
(Stahmer & Mandell, 2007). The voluntary Part C program established in 1990 has nevertheless 
gained participation from all states and, because of its flexible nature, has manifested itself in 
different ways depending on state determination for eligibility of services and what services are 
provided (Stahmer & Mandell, 2007). Although it has not been systematically examined,  
Mandell and Palmer (as cited in Stahmer  &  Mandell, 2007, p.30) suspect that these state 
policy variations may account for some of the 8-fold difference across states in the number of 
children ages 6–21 years receiving special education services for ASD. 
A variety of distinct statewide programs for autism exist ranging from waivers and 
housing options for autistic adults in Pennsylvania to autism vouchers or scholarship programs 
for autistic youth in states like Florida and Ohio. Medicaid waivers that provide community 
supports for eligible individuals with autism are available in Maryland, Colorado, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. According to Caronna and Halfon (2003), combined with the 
decreasing stigma associated with ASD due to a broader array of disorders being included in the 
spectrum over the past decade, there has been an incentive for diagnosis in states where 
federally sponsored Social Security Insurance benefits rely on the autism label. Not 
surprisingly, some enhanced educational and treatment services through IDEA also rely on an 
autism diagnosis.  
Psychiatrists and psychologists hired by the parents of autistic children understand that 
diagnosis greatly influences placement in appropriate educational programs. As such, they 
might have to ask parents to accept a certain (potentially stronger) diagnosis, even if it is 
undesirable, in order to get a child into the most appropriate class (Grinker, 2007). In New York 
State, the difference between an ASD diagnosis and Asperger‘s Disorder or PDD-NOS 
diagnosis means that children will be eligible for different special education programs, even if, Wronski 11 
 
according to psychiatrist Margaret Herzig, they would all probably be better served in an autism 
class. Further, physicians have been pressured to respond to the incentive by making earlier 
ASD diagnoses, even in young children (<5 years) who have mild symptoms (Caronna  &  
Halfon, 2003). Prior to 1990, such diagnoses were rare; however, more recently an increasing 
number of children are being diagnosed with autism, with numbers particularly growing among 
younger children and children with milder symptoms. Despite these pressures of earlier ASD 
diagnosis, a Gurney et al. study (as cited in Caronna  &  Halfon, 2003, p. 620) suggests that a 
significant proportion (at least half) of children are receiving an ASD diagnosis after the ages of 
5 or 6 years. Additional incentives to identify children with ASD may also be present among 
older children in the school system that might have a range of behavioral problems and mixed 
cognitive deficits and would benefit from ASD diagnosis-dependent special education services. 
In addition to earlier diagnoses, a shift to autism diagnoses from other diagnoses (such as 
mental retardation) has also been occurring (Caronna  &  Halfon, 2003). This substitution effect 
occurs when reporting only a primary diagnosis of autism confers eligibility for services. 
Caronna and Halfon  (2003) note that due to changing stigma and incentives, more children 
with both ASD and mental retardation are being categorized as having ASD. This hypothesis 
was supported in a 1999 California report showing a tremendous jump in children receiving 
special services with a primary diagnosis of ASD concurrent with a decrease in children 
receiving services with a primary diagnosis of mental retardation (Caronna  &  Halfon, 2003). 
 
Externalities and Ethical Implications of Increased Autism Treatment, Services, and Awareness 
  Certainly, advances made in the detection, treatment, and provision of services for 
autism have improved child outcomes and better helped families cope with the challenges of the Wronski 12 
 
disorder. Yet, as alluded to previously, the increased attention and resources for tackling autism 
may have also provided some physicians and families with an incentive to provide an autism 
diagnosis. Caronna and Halfon  (2003) express concern that the broad and flexibly-interpreted 
autism ―spectrum‖ diagnosis may lead to a misallocation of educational resources away from 
children with more severe autism and autistic children with greater financial need. 
Unfortunately, the ability of financial incentives to drive autism diagnoses is a reality (Grinker, 
2007). For example, in Maryland, a Medicaid waiver will allow an autistic child to receive 
intensive supports and medical care even if his or her family is not near the poverty line, but 
will offer nothing to a child with mental retardation living in the same financial circumstances 
(Grinker, 2007). Ohio‘s autism scholarship program works in a similar way in that it requires an 
autism diagnosis to qualify a child for service eligibility. And as Shattuck and Grosse note, 
―whether program eligibility hinges on a diagnosis of autism can significantly influence the 
capacity of service systems to accurately determine who has autism‖ (2007). There is reason to 
suspect that, when faced with these incentives, service systems will take advantage of the ―soft‖ 
(as opposed to ―hard‖ straightforward physical impairment) diagnostic nature of autism and, in 
turn, yield related increases in autism prevalence. Indeed, Lester and Kelman (1997) have found 
that the ways diagnoses are interpreted ―as well as, or instead of, actual disease prevalence‖ are 
related to variation in state-level learning disability (LD) diagnostic levels. Because this 
relationship was found most strongly among soft LD diagnoses, there is reason to suspect that 
autism may respond similarly to diagnostic practices.  
One factor that can influence a state‘s autism diagnostic practices is the availability of 
financial or fiscal incentives for diagnosis. Stahmer and Mandell (2007) revealed that the limited 
number of studies of the effects of policy variation on service delivery find education policies Wronski 13 
 
and level of aid for children with disabilities highly predictive of the proportion of identified 
learning disabilities. One such study, by Cullen (2003), which examined the elasticity of student 
disability rates with respect to the generosity of state reimbursements, found that when Texas 
state aid was varied as a result of a policy change, fiscal incentives explained ―nearly 40% of the 
recent growth in student disability rates.‖ Because changes in the size and characteristics of 
beneficiary populations affect not only ultimate costs but also may undermine stated policy 
objectives, Cullen believes that understanding the relationship between social insurance program 
generosity and caseloads is essential for program design.   
  Other factors that can also impact autism diagnoses are insurance reimbursement and 
treatment possibilities (Grinker, 2007). An example of the former is provided through a 
personal anecdote from Grinker; he lost hundreds of dollars during the first few months of his 
daughter‘s autism diagnosis because the speech therapist had submitted the bills under the 
diagnosis code of ―Mixed Receptive-Expressive Language Disorder.‖ After the code was 
changed to autism, the insurance company suddenly started to reimburse him. Indeed, insurance 
coverage and reimbursement as well as economic issues were factors reported by a majority of 
respondents in a Rushton et al. (2002) survey as reasons for alternative coding. Further, the 
survey found that over two thirds of providers reported ever using an alternate diagnostic code, 
and many reported common use (monthly-weekly) (Rushton et al, 2002). Approximately 10% 
used alternate diagnostic codes on a daily basis (Rushton et al., 2002). A statistically significant 
52.5 to 23.9 percent of physicians (p < .001; range reflects the maximum and minimum among 
different medical specialty averages) ever using alternative coding did so for an autism 
spectrum disorder (Rushton et al., 2002).  Wronski 14 
 
Another motivation for alternative coding is access to treatment possibilities that are 
diagnosis-dependent. Doctors will make an ASD diagnosis, even when they were not certain 
that it is the correct diagnosis, for the purposes of educational ASD ascertainment, so the child 
can access additional educational resources (Skellern et al., 2005) or for the purposes of 
medication prescription (Grinker, 2007). In a survey of Australian clinicians, Skellern et al. 
(2005) found that 58 percent (60 doctors) reported on at least one occasion providing an 
uncertain ASD diagnosis, with most (56 out of 60) reporting that the child's existing symptoms 
were only upgraded for the purposes of ASD ascertainment. 
Using Skellern et al.‘s (2005) data, Shattuck and Grosse (2007) assert that Ohio‘s ASP 
and similar programs, which give families a lump sum to pay for therapeutic intervention outside 
the public special education system and rely on an ASD diagnosis for funding or services, have 
been found to influence clinical diagnostic conclusions. Despite the unknown effectiveness of 
the program, parent satisfaction seems to drive the desire to take advantage of the financial 
incentive; parents of the 178 students participating in the program at the start of 2004-2005 
report being highly satisfied (Shattuck & Grosse, 2007). Nevertheless, Shattuck and Grosse 
(2007) note that school district officials were concerned that the Ohio program – which, with no 
new appropriations and funded from state and local budgets - could generate a ―negative 
financial impact, including the need to reduce services to other children in special education.‖ It 
was these concerns that led a Wisconsin bill for a similar autism scholarship program to be 
defeated in 2006.  
  In all of these scenarios there is a concern that the increasing resources for coping with 
autism could be exploited. Because there is often a disconnect between those who implement 
the policy and those who determine eligibility for the policy, gaps may be created between the Wronski 15 
 
intended user of a particular treatment, service, or medication, and the ultimate recipient. Given 
the particular flexibility of the autism ―spectrum‖ diagnosis, this can make determination of 
budget and resource allocation extremely difficult for policy makers.     
Key Findings 
  Although a variety of pre-natal and post-natal environmental factors have been 
identified as being associated with autism, little is known about the actual causes of autism. As 
such, it may be hard for parents to avoid the development of autism that will ultimately disable 
and financially burden their child, and family, for life. With seemingly little to be done to 
prevent autism from developing, resources have been devoted to developing effective early 
intervention therapies to overcome the symptoms of the disorder. When a parent‘s only choice 
to improve his or her child‘s future is autism-diagnosis-dependent services and financial 
resources, they may opt for - or even actively pursue - an autism diagnosis for the child. Indeed, 
the reported literature establishes a strong case for the argument that diagnoses may be getting 
―upgraded‖ to formal autism in the face of financial and/or service incentives. Yet, a weakness 
of many of these studies is that they fail to formally quantify the impact that diagnosis-
dependent service availability or financial resources have on autism rates. Many are simply 
observational in nature. I will further the literature in my study by attempting to quantify the 
impact of one such diagnosis-dependent autism resource – the Ohio ASP – on autism rates. 
A Program Case Study: The Ohio Autism Scholarship Program  
The Ohio Autism Scholarship Program allows the Ohio State Department of Education to 
pay a scholarship to the parents of a qualified child with autism (2010). The non-means-tested 
program currently provides parents of children with an autism spectrum disorder public funds of 
up to $20,000 per year (and up to $7,000 per quarter) to purchase education or treatment at Wronski 16 
 
private schools or other approved facilities (Van Lier, 2008). Although families of all income 
levels are eligible, their child must have an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) diagnosis in his or 
her Individualized Education Plan (IEP), the written document that outlines the child‘s education 
needs. Van Lier (2008) states that ―preschool-age children must be evaluated by a physician or 
psychologist using criteria for autism spectrum disorder in the 4th edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and must have deficits in communication and adaptive 
behavior and ‗at least three observations that document behavior consistent with autism 
conducted by a nonfamily member who is knowledgeable about autism.‖ In fiscal year 2007, 
approximately 50 percent of all program participants were preschoolers (Van Lier, 2008). Even 
so, children up to age 21 (and as young as 3) can qualify for the program, so long as they are 
enrolled or eligible to enroll in their school district of residence at any level from preschool to 
12
th grade in accordance with the Ohio Revised Code (Van Lier, 2008).  This program is one of 
only four of its kind in the United States; Florida, Utah, and Arizona possess similar 
scholarships.  
Another stipulation of the program is that scholarship funds be used at one or more 
providers on an approved list. The number of approved providers in the program has grown from 
200 in 32 of Ohio‘s 88 counties in October 2007 to 243 in 38 Ohio counties according to the 
most recent Department of Education reports. The number of students using the program has also 
grown since its inception from 70 students in 2003 to 1,495 students in 2010. Providers wishing 
to be approved in the program must apply through the Office of Exceptional Children of the 
Ohio State Department of Education.  
Statement of Major Research Questions Wronski 17 
 
The major research question to be explored in this study is:Do financial incentives for families 
affect autism diagnoses?  
Specifically, I will be exploring the question of whether programs that provide a financial 
incentive for children to be diagnosed with autism affect the number of formal autism diagnoses. 
Furthermore, I will be examining how autism incidence rates compare (1) between Ohio and 
nearby and far states that have not implemented the program and (2) within Ohio between 
counties have been able to utilize the program to varying degrees due to provider availability. 
Statement of Hypotheses to be Tested 
H1: Holding all other factors constant and allowing for differences in baseline autism rates, 
Ohio‘s autism incidence rates will be greater than those of other states with the implementation 
of the Scholarship program in 2004. 
H2: Ohio counties with providers in which the program can actually be implemented will 
experience a greater than average increase in autism rates during the years of the policy (2004-
2009) relative to Ohio counties with no providers, controlling for socio-economic factors in the 
county.  
Motivation: If financial incentives affect diagnoses, I would expect Ohio‘s autism rates to jump 
where comparison states‘ rates have not because the Scholarship program provides parents with 
the impetus to obtain an ASD school diagnosis for their child, whereas parents in comparison 
states do not experience a change in financial incentive. Through the Autism Scholarship 
Program, Ohio has made a link between diagnosis and access to services that may be less salient 
in other states.  Wronski 18 
 
Methods 
Description of Data Set 
State Analysis: The state-level analysis utilizes data from the 2005 Interim State Population 
Projections of the U.S. Census Bureau Population Division to estimate the overall state 
population of 3 to 22-year-olds from 2000 to 2008 for each U.S. state. The dataset consists of 
estimates for the population at each age (from 0 to 85+) for the year 2000 and for each year from 
2004 to 2030. Because the state autism counts from U.S. Special Education data are only 
available from 2000 to 2008 for ages 3 to 22, I linearly interpolate the population of 3 to 22-year-
olds for the years 2001 to 2003. The autism count data are a part of a larger set of child count 
data collected annually by the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education 
Programs (OSEP) in accordance with Section 618 of Individual with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA). Each state collects its own data and submits those data to the OSEP, where it is, in turn, 
used to prepare reports for the US Congress. The data are made publically available on 
thoughtfulhouse.org.  
Ohio County Analysis: Online data are available from the Power User Reports of the Ohio State 
Department of Education Interactive Local Report Card (iLRC). Data from this database include 
enrollment and demographics of students at the state, district, and school building levels for each 
school year. The number of autistic children aged 3 to 21 is available for each year from 1995 to 
2010 on a school building level in county datasets. A separate iLRC dataset on total enrollment 
for each school (at the building level) in a county is also available for 1995 to 2010. It is 
therefore necessary to sum these school level autism enrollment counts and divide them by 
summed school enrollment totals in order to calculate county-level autism rates for a given year. Wronski 19 
 
A list of approved 2006-2007 ASP providers provided by School Choice Ohio is also used to 
determine if counties have providers and, if so, how many. This list is updated annually, with 
2010-2011 being the most current sample available. Although the number of providers in a 
county can change from year to year, making a provider county a non-provider county and vice-
versa, these post-policy yearly changes are not integral to this analysis, which is why I have not 
included yearly provider count data. Ideally, pre-policy data should be included to show how 
providers responded to the policy by moving into many counties that have a large potential 
patient population. Because such data are unavailable, I utilize the earliest list of approved 
providers available, from two years after the ASP began operation. 
Description of Dependent/Outcome Variables 
State Analysis: Because rates can be skewed if a state population is small, a negative binomial 
regression will be performed using autism counts and adjusting for population size. Thus, two 
dependent variables are observed separately. The unit of observation in the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression is the mean autism rate for 3-22 year-olds per 100,000 children age 3-22 for 
state in a given year from 2000 to 2008. For example, if the state was Ohio and the year was 
2004, then the outcome variable would represent the mean autism rate for Ohio in 2004. States 
are categorized according to whether they are near or far from Ohio (defined further below). The 
second unit of observation in the negative binomial regression is the mean autism count among 
3-22 year-olds for a state in a given year from 2000 to 2008, controlling for the state‘s 3-22 year-
old population in that given year.  
Ohio County Analysis: Just as in the state analysis, it is important to observe both autism rates 
and counts. The unit of observation in the OLS regression is the mean autism rate for 3-21 year-Wronski 20 
 
olds per 100,000 students age 3-21 for a county in a given year from 1995 to 2010. For example, 
if the county was Cuyahoga and the year was 2004, then the outcome variable would represent 
the mean autism rate for Cuyahoga County in 2004. Counties are categorized according to 
whether they had no provider, any provider, or more than one provider in 2006. In the negative 
binomial regression, we observe the mean autism count among 3-21 year-olds for a county in a 
given year, controlling for the total 3-21 year-old student enrollment in that year.  
Description of Explanatory Variables 
State Analysis: 
Near – A dummy variable (1 or 0) that indicates whether a state is near Ohio (within 200 miles) 
or not. The variable is equal to 0 for Ohio.  
Far – A dummy variable (1 or 0) that indicates whether a state is far from Ohio (beyond 200 
miles) or not. The variable is equal to 0 for Ohio. 
Timetrend – A variable that codes for the year. It is equal to 0 in 2000, 1 in 2001, and so on.  
Post – A dummy variable (1 or 0) that indicates whether the year is before (2000-2003) or after 
(2004-2008) the Ohio ASP was enacted.  
Posttime – An interaction term generated by multiplying post by timetrend.  
Posttimenear – An interaction term generated by multiplying post by timetrend and near.  
Posttimefar – An interaction term generated by multiplying post by timetrend and far. 
Ohio County Analysis: Wronski 21 
 
Provider – A dummy variable (1 or 0) that indicates whether a county has any approved 
scholarship program providers or not.  
Providerhigh – A dummy variable (1 or 0) that indicates whether a county has more than 1 
provider or not. 
Timetrend – A variable that codes for the year. It is equal to 0 in 1995, 1 in 1996, and so on.  
Post– A dummy variable (1 or 0) that indicates whether the year is before (1995-2003) or after 
(2004-2010) the Ohio ASP was enacted. 
Posttime – An interaction term generated by multiplying post by timetrend.  
Posttimeprovider – An interaction term generated by multiplying post by timetrend and provider.  
Posttimehigh– An interaction term generated by multiplying post by timetrend and 
providerhigh.Specification of Empirical Model 
In order to determine whether changes in autism rates or counts are attributable to the Ohio ASP, 
I perform both a state and Ohio county analysis. Both analyses include two regressions: an OLS 
model observing mean autism rates, and a negative binomial regression observing mean autism 
counts. The state analysis allows me to see if the ASP was associated with an increase in autism 
rates in Ohio relative to other states that have not enacted the policy. Distinguishing between 
states that are near versus far from Ohio allows me to observe whether families who live in states 
near to Ohio may move to Ohio to take advantage of the program, over families living in states 
that are far away who are more unlikely to do so. Either way, results from the OLS and negative 
binomial regression should complement each other. The county analysis is less definitive than 
the state analysis for determining whether the ASP caused autism rates to increase. This is Wronski 22 
 
because an increase in autism rates observed among Ohio provider counties relative to non-
provider counties may be misleading and actually reflect a re-distribution of autism cases within 
Ohio. Perhaps the policy causes families with autistic children that would have otherwise been 
randomly dispersed throughout Ohio counties to move, or simply drive, to counties with 
providers where they can utilize the financial incentive of the ASP. Alone, the county analysis 
can only show how the provider market may have responded to changes in the demand for 
autism services. If this analysis shows an increase in autism rates and counts for high provider 
counties and there was an overall increase in autism rates and counts in Ohio relative to other 
states, only then can the hypothesis be supported.  
For the following analysis model descriptions, please refer to the regression equations at the 
bottom of each section to see where variables discussed appear in the regression.  
State Analysis: I will determine whether Ohio‘s autism rate changes differently relative to other 
states, particularly after the Autism Scholarship Program was put into effect in 2004.  I assume 
that no other significant changes have taken place that would make the states incomparable and 
verify that comparison states have not enacted any policies or made any other changes that might 
impact autism rates. Two groups of comparison states will be created using dummy variables: (1) 
states close to Ohio (within 200 miles, includes Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia) and (2) all other far states. 
Since Ohio falls into neither category, the dummy for each group will equal 0 for Ohio. Mean 
autism rates are then formed for these groups for each year ( . The ―near‖ and 
―far‖ indicator variables allow the autism rates to differ between Ohio and these two groups of 
states.  The coefficient on the timetrend variable (  indicates the average annual increase in the 
autism rate nationally. This allows me to conduct a difference-in-difference approach and control Wronski 23 
 
for the fact that autism rates were not the same between Ohio and near and far states. Using the 
timetrend variable, I am allowing for a national trend of increasing autism rates to occur. The 
coefficient   indicates whether the autism rate increased at a greater rate nationally after the 
policy relative to before; the coefficients   and   measure whether the autism rate increased at 
a different rate in the near and far states after the ASP relative to Ohio. If my hypothesis is 
correct that the Ohio policy was associated with unique increases in autism rates relative to other 
states, then the coefficients on  will be negative and statistically significant. The post 
( ) variable is included in the regression to help with the interpretation of the posttime 
interaction variables of interest. With these explanatory variables, the dependent variable of 
mean autism rate for a state‘s category (near, far, or Ohio) in a given year is estimated. 
 
A similar negative binomial regression (nbreg) using the data on the number of cases of age 3-22 
autism is performed. This is essential because OLS regressions are limited in their ability to 
estimate count data. It is important to also look at autism counts because rates can easily be 
skewed if the state is small or scarcely populated and a few cases are left out. Another way to 
think about it is that the autism rates in the more populated states will be more accurate than in 
the less populated sates. Further, the nbreg model will be a better fit for the over-dispersion 
shown in the outcome variable of autism counts and even rates. A simple histogram (Figure 1) 
confirms the highly skewed-right nature of the data. Although the histogram depicts autism 
counts, the same skew pattern can be seen for autism rates. 
Figure 1: Skewed-Right Dispersion of State Autism Count Data Wronski 24 
 
 
By using autism counts in a negative binomial regression, one is able to adjust for the population 
size. The dependent variable observed here is the average number of autism cases of autism for 
3-22 year olds in a given year in a given state. As with the OLS regression, I will focus on 
interpreting the coefficients  . The nbreg regression is conceptually the same as the OLS 
regressions, except for the outcome variable and the inclusion of the total population of 3 to 22 
year-olds in a state.   
Ohio County Analysis: I will determine whether there are significant differences in the change 
in autism rates within Ohio by comparing the roughly 43% of counties that have approved 
providers with the roughly 57% of counties that do not currently have any approved providers  
with which the Autism Scholarship Program can be utilized. A subset group of high provider Wronski 25 
 
counties will be arbitrarily created that consists of counties with more than 1 provider, since one 
could argue that counties with only one provider offer little added choice to parents and more 
closely share the experiences of a county without any providers at all. I perform two similar, but 
separate regressions: first (A) comparing the autism rates in a given year between a group of 
counties that have any number of providers with the counties that have no providers, and second 
(B) comparing the autism rates in a given year between a group of counties that have a ―high‖ 
(>1) number of providers with all other counties. These two regressions are necessary because if 
both the provider variable and high provider variable were included in one regression, there 
would be overlap and interpretation of the coefficients would be difficult. Because application to 
the Ohio ASP relies on a school diagnosis of an ASD, this analysis looks at school-reported 
autism enrollment rates. Mean autism rates are then formed for the groups (depending on which 
regression version is used) for each year ( . The timetrend variable (  measures the 
average annual increase in autism rates statewide. This allows me to conduct a difference-in-
difference approach and control for the fact that autism rates were not the same between non-
provider, provider, and high provider counties. The timetrend variable of the state analysis is 
used similarly here, controlling for the potential statewide increasing trend in autism rates. The 
posttime coefficient  indicates whether the autism rate increased at a greater rate statewide after 
the policy relative to before.  , depending on the version of the equation, measures whether the 
autism rate increase at a different rate in (a) the provider counties relative to the non-provider 
counties or (b) the high provider counties relative to all other counties. If my hypothesis is 
correct that the Ohio policy was, in fact, associated with increases in autism rates in provider 
counties where the policy could easily be used relative to non-provider counties, then the 
coefficients   (for both versions of  ) will be positive and statistically significant. The post Wronski 26 
 
( ) variable is included in the regression to help with the interpretation of the posttime 
interaction variables of interest. With these explanatory variables, the dependent variable of 
mean autism rate for a county‘s category (non-provider, provider, or high provider) in a given 
year is estimated.  
A. Comparing autism rates in counties that have any providers vs. counties with no providers: 
 
B. Comparing autism rates in counties that have a ―high‖ (>1) number of providers vs. all other 
counties: 
 
For the same reasons as in the state analysis, I also perform a similar nbreg using the Ohio 
county autism count data. Similarly, adjustments are made for the county population size. The 
dependent variable observed here is the average number of autism cases in a given year in a 
given county. As with the OLS regression, it is important to focus on  . The nbreg regressions 
are the same as the OLS regressions, except for the outcome variable and the inclusion of the 
number of students in the enrolled population of a county as an exposure. There are also two 
nbreg regressions, one using the provider group and the other using the high provider group as 
the point of comparison. The histogram (Figure 2) below shows that because the county autism 
count data is also over-dispersed and skewed right, the nbreg model is likely a better fit for this 
analysis. The autism rate data also displays similar skewed-right dispersion. 
Figure 2: Skewed-Right Dispersion of County Autism Count Data Wronski 27 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
State Analysis: The state analysis included all 51 states (District of Columbia included), with 9 
of 50 (Ohio is excluded) near states. Table 1 shows the number of observations, means, standard 
deviations, minimums and maximums for each variable in the analysis. Table 2 shows the mean 
autism rates per 100,000 3 to 22 year-olds for each state group (far, near, or Ohio) from 2000 to 
2008; it corresponds to the Figure 3 graph. Figure 3 shows that the rates of autism in Ohio began 
much lower than the mean rates of near and far states but, by the time the Ohio ASP was enacted 
in 2004, Ohio‘s autism rates were the same as the far state rates and by the end of the period of 
observation in 2008, they were higher than both state groups. Table 3 depicts the mean number 
of autism cases for people aged 3 to 22 for each state group (far, near, or Ohio) from 2000 to Wronski 28 
 
2008. The corresponding graph (Figure 4), shows that while autism counts were similar between 
Ohio and neighboring states, they began to diverge – with Ohio‘s counts exceeding those of 
nearby states – in 2001. The number of cases of autism was still higher in the Ohio area as 
compared with far states. 
Table 1: State Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
year  459  2004  2.584806  2000  2008 
Population  459  1675064  2365931  130366  3.36E+07 
autcases  457  3958  5717.43  108  53050 
autrate  457  226.7363  132.2971  9.117674  872.6781 
near  459  0.1764706  0.381636  0  1 
far  459  0.8039216  0.3974618  0  1 
post  459  0.5555556  0.4974462  0  1 
timetrend  459  4  2.584806  0  8 
postnear  459  0.0980392  0.2976921  0  1 
posttimenear  459  0.5882353  1.840339  0  8 
posttimefar  459  2.679739  3.13242  0  8 
posttime  459  3.333333  3.165728  0  8 
 
Table 2: Mean Autism Rates per 100,000 3-22-year-olds by State Category 
Mean Autism Rate  Far  Near  Ohio Wronski 29 
 
2000  105.9061  116.5303  78.92518 
2001  130.7824  138.2959  105.6981 
2002  157.7807  164.4279  136.2092 
2003  185.662  193.4411  172.614 
2004  210.9585  226.1309  210.7582 
2005  244.3266  263.2463  253.7616 
2006  288.4065  304.8033  302.1811 
2007  333.351  349.9618  325.4756 
2008  366.1967  395.4299  403.8157 
Figure 3: Mean Autism Rates per 100,000 3 to 22-year-olds by State Category 
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Table 3: Mean Autism Counts for 3-22-year-olds by State Category  
Year  Far  Near  Ohio 
2000  1574.66  2875.89  2543 
2001  1965  3345.78  3391 
2002  2361.15  3978.56  4351 
2003  2809.44  4674.78  5490 
2004  3276.83  5477.67  6674 
2005  3809.8  6379.44  7993 
2006  4425.49  7476.22  9469 
2007  5214.75  8577.22  10155 
2008  5913.28  9655  12537 Wronski 31 
 
Figure 4: Mean Autism Counts for 3 to 22-year-olds by State Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ohio County Analysis: 
This analysis included all 88 of Ohio‘s counties. Table 4 shows the number of observations, 
means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums for each variable in the analysis. Table 5 
shows the mean autism rates for each county group (non-provider, provider, high provider, low 
and no provider) from 1995 to 2010; it corresponds to the Figure 5 graph. Figure 5 shows that 
from 1995-1997 no Ohio counties have any cases of autism. From 1997-2002 provider counties 
are the only counties to have cases of autism, while non-provider counties continue to have 0 
cases. Although some pre-policy differences existed between all 4 provider type county groups, 
the increase in autism rates is still far more rapid in the provider county groups relative to the no Wronski 32 
 
provider counties after the policy was enacted in 2004, particularly for the high provider counties 
(> 1). The purple line (# Providers ≤ 1) shows that the mean autism rates in low provider 
counties are very similar to no provider counties and follow a very similar trend, supporting the 
legitimacy of categorizing the low provider counties with the no provider counties. Table 6 and 
Figure 6 depict the same information for autism counts. As you can see from the graph in Figure 
6, the trends in autism counts could be characterized similarly as the trends in autism rates.   
Table 4: Ohio County Analysis Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Year  1320  2002  4.322131  1995  2009 
Policy_Year  1320  0.4666667  0.4990767  0  1 
Provider  1320  0.3522727  0.4778594  0  1 
NumProviders  247  0.8421053  4.482505  0  43 
Total_Enro~d  1320  20598.95  31748.83  1986  202187 
Autism_Count  1320  14.02273  66.65466  0  909 
Ratep~100000  1320  24.71559  79.52949  0  638.2397 
providerhigh  1320  0.1590909  0.3658995  0  1 
timetrend  1320  7  4.322131  0  14 
posttime  1320  5.133333  5.657426  0  14 Wronski 33 
 
Mean Autism Rate No ProvidersAny Providers# Providers > 1 # Providers ≤ 1
1995 0 0.33381347 0.73915839 0
1996 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0.24385431 0.53996312 0
1998 0 3.0955128 6.8543497 0
1999 0 1.6224485 3.5925646 0
2000 0 4.4128864 9.7713913 0
2001 0 7.7965096 17.2637 0
2002 3.4591276 13.786327 30.526866 2.6644631
2003 13.446728 38.10462 58.82763 15.190809
2004 16.002629 50.371778 92.787183 15.873708
2005 3.6920348 53.29354 98.352388 6.5623283
2006 20.093321 82.005642 152.84554 20.914279
2007 21.496838 116.05959 202.49467 26.868132
2008 28.918623 172.91777 291.73321 39.520913
2009 44.069828 230.38703 366.74065 61.075799
posttimepr~r  1320  1.808333  4.158398  0  14 
posttimehigh  1320  0.8166667  2.935965  0  14 
 
Table 5: Mean Autism Rates per 100,000 3-22-year-olds by County Category  
 
Figure 5: Mean Autism Rates per 100,000 3 to 22-year-olds by County Category Wronski 34 
 
Table 6: Mean Autism Counts for 3 to 22-year-olds by County Category  
 
Figure 6: Mean Autism Counts for 3 to 22-year-olds by County Category 
Results 
State Analysis: 
Mean Autism Count No ProvidersAny Providers# Providers > 1 # Providers ≤ 1
1995 0 0.516129 1.14286
1996 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0.387097 0.857143 0
1998 0 4.93548 10.9286 0
1999 0 2 4.42857 0
2000 0 6.09677 13.5 0
2001 0 7.74194 17.1429 0
2002 0.491228 13.129 29.0714 0.378378
2003 1.50877 26.1935 53 2.10811
2004 1.77193 40.1936 84.1429 2.28378
2005 0.421053 45.8064 96.1429 1.32432
2006 1.96491 65.4516 136.857 3.04054
2007 2.21053 87.8387 181.143 4.22973
2008 3.52632 120.677 245.357 6.85135
2009 5.77193 143.645 286.786 10.3649Wronski 35 
 
Based on the ordinary least-squares regression technique using the autism rate per 100,000 
persons aged 3 to 22 in a state as the dependent variable, the coefficients 
 were negative, consistent with my hypothesis. The 
coefficient on posttimenear was more negative than the coefficient on posttimefar. Thus, these 
coefficients show that the autism rate per 100,000 children was less in the near states than in 
Ohio and even more less in the far states than in Ohio in a given year. Despite all of this, no 
statistical significance was shown for the variables of interest – posttimenear and posttimefar. 
Any difference in the autism rates between Ohio, near states, and far states, is therefore due to 
chance. Table 7. Of note, however, is the statistically significant coefficient  . It shows that 
nationally, on average, the autism rate was increasing by 26.5 cases per 100,000 3 to 22 year olds 
per year. 
Table 7: OLS Regression for State Analysis observing Autism Rates per 100,000 3 to 22-Year 
Olds 
autra~100000  Coef.  Std. Err.  T  P>t  [95% Conf.  Interval] 
Near  29.71423  51.41008  0.58  0.564  -71.32002  130.7485 
Far  21.84146  49.36336  0.44  0.658  -75.17045  118.8534 
timetrend  26.54956  6.306163  4.21  0  14.1563  38.94281 
Policyyear  -57.0984  29.98972  -1.9  0.058  -116.036  1.839243 
posttime  18.94626  13.04678  1.45  0.147  -6.69408  44.5866 
posttimenear  -3.48665  11.18904  -0.31  0.755  -25.47604  18.50273 
posttimefar  -5.42312  10.74477  -0.5  0.614  -26.5394  15.69316 
_cons  83.41767  49.71177  1.68  0.094  -14.27896  181.1143 
 
In the negative binomial regression (Table 8), a likelihood ratio test that alpha equals zero is 
performed. The chi-squared value obtained was 3.8e+05 with one degree of freedom, indicating 
the high level of over-dispersion and thus, that the negative binomial model fits the data better Wronski 36 
 
than the OLS model. The nbreg regression significantly changed the coefficients on posttimenear 
and posttimefar from what they were in the OLS regression. Both coefficients were less negative 
(nearly 0) and statistically insignificant. This means that the average number of autism cases in 
near and far states were less than (but to a lesser extent than the OLS regression depicted) the 
rates in Ohio.  
Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression for State Analysis Observing the Number of Autism 
Cases among 3-22 Year-Olds 
 
County Analysis: 
Based on an OLS regression technique observing the autism rate per 100,000 students in a given 
year in a given county, the coefficients   derived from 
conducting two regressions (Tables 9 and 10) were positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with my hypothesis. The coefficient on posttimeprovider, the variable concerned with 
demonstrating the effect of provider status on autism rates in counties, was lower and less 
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 457
LR chi2(7) = 315.58
Dispersion     = mean Prob > chi2 = 0
Log likelihood = -3690.0581 Pseudo R2 = 0.041
autcases3~22 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Near 0.229979 0.204138 1.13 0.26 -0.170124 0.6300821
Far 0.1706896 0.1960541 0.87 0.384 -0.2135694 0.5549485
timetrend 0.1854164 0.0251421 7.37 0 0.1361387 0.234694
Policyyear 0.1250527 0.1194963 1.05 0.295 -0.1091559 0.3592612
posttime -0.0121199 0.051828 -0.23 0.815 -0.1137009 0.089461
posttimenear -0.0318868 0.044532 -0.72 0.474 -0.1191678 0.0553943
posttimefar -0.0326697 0.042781 -0.76 0.445 -0.1165189 0.0511796
_cons -7.006234 0.1978865 -35.41 0 -7.394084 -6.618384
Populatio~22 (exposure)
/lnalpha   -1.840925 0.064816 -1.967962 -1.713888
alpha 0.1586706 0.0102844 0.1397414 0.180164
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:   chibar2(01) = 3.8e+05  Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000Wronski 37 
 
statistically significant than the coefficient on the variable posttimehigh, the variable concerned 
with demonstrating the effect of provider status on autism rates in counties more than 1 provider 
(a ―high‖ number of providers). This means that counties with providers experienced a 
significantly greater growth rate in autism rates than counties without providers and ―high‖ 
provider counties had significantly greater autism rates than low or no provider counties. This 
sort of observed ―dose response‖ was correctly predicted in my hypothesis.  
Table 9: OLS Regression for County Analysis Observing Autism Rate per 100,000 3-21-Year-
Olds Using Provider Counties as Comparison Group 
 
Table 10: OLS Regression for County Analysis Observing Autism Rate per 100,000 3-21-Year-
Olds Using High Provider Counties as Comparison Group 
 
However, in the negative binomial regression using autism counts the dependent variable 
controlling for total enrollment independently, both coefficients on the any number of provider 
Ratep~100000 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Provider -2.31565 5.176068 -0.45 0.655 -12.46991 7.838616
timetrend 0.791383 1.094089 0.72 0.47 -1.354969 2.937734
Policy_Year -104.739 15.66497 -6.69 0 -135.4704 -74.00822
posttime 10.46365 1.746302 5.99 0 7.037807 13.8895
posttimepr~r 8.545284 0.6777064 12.61 0 7.215779 9.874789
_cons -0.29614 4.92674 -0.06 0.952 -9.961279 9.368992
Ratep~100000 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
providerhigh -0.76523 6.101551 -0.13 0.9 -12.73508 11.20461
timetrend 0.791383 0.9875392 0.8 0.423 -1.145943 2.728708
Policy_Year -104.739 14.13941 -7.41 0 -132.4776 -77.00101
posttime 11.08575 1.5666 7.08 0 8.012434 14.15906
posttimehigh 15.01139 0.7988805 18.79 0 13.44417 16.57861
_cons -0.99014 4.243683 -0.23 0.816 -9.315276 7.334994
Ratep~100000 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
Provider -2.31565 5.176068 -0.45 0.655 -12.46991 7.838616
timetrend 0.791383 1.094089 0.72 0.47 -1.354969 2.937734
Policy_Year -104.739 15.66497 -6.69 0 -135.4704 -74.00822
posttime 10.46365 1.746302 5.99 0 7.037807 13.8895
posttimepr~r 8.545284 0.6777064 12.61 0 7.215779 9.874789
_cons -0.29614 4.92674 -0.06 0.952 -9.961279 9.368992
Ratep~100000 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
providerhigh -0.76523 6.101551 -0.13 0.9 -12.73508 11.20461
timetrend 0.791383 0.9875392 0.8 0.423 -1.145943 2.728708
Policy_Year -104.739 14.13941 -7.41 0 -132.4776 -77.00101
posttime 11.08575 1.5666 7.08 0 8.012434 14.15906
posttimehigh 15.01139 0.7988805 18.79 0 13.44417 16.57861
_cons -0.99014 4.243683 -0.23 0.816 -9.315276 7.334994Wronski 38 
 
and high provider counties were negative (see Tables 11 and 12). The coefficient for any number 
of provider counties was close to 0 (-0.08). The coefficient for high provider counties was 
negative but almost 0 (-0.16). Both the coefficients on posttimeprovider and posttimehigh were 
significant. The results of this regression set seem to directly contradict the previous OLS results 
and suggest that there are fewer autism cases in provider counties relative to no provider 
counties. Thus, an inverse dose response appears here and contradicts the hypothesis. These two 
nbreg models nevertheless show that there was a statistically significant increase in autism cases 
occurring statewide in Ohio by an average 0.65-0.77cases per year. Because the chi-squared 
values (1.30e+04, and 9990.86, for the provider regression and the high provider regression, 
respectively) indicate that the nbreg model takes into account the over-dispersion of the count 
data and is stronger than the OLS model, these results might take precedence. 
Table 11: Negative Binomial Regression for County Analysis Observing Autism Count Using 
Any Number of Provider Counties as Comparison Group 
Negative binomial 
regression 
Number of 
obs  =  1320 
 
LR chi2(5)  =  256.05 
Dispersion     = mean  Prob> chi2  =  0 
Log likelihood = -
1488.2455  Pseudo R2  =  0.0792 
 
 
Autism_Count Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Provider 2.48982 0.4378394 5.69 0 1.631671 3.34797
timetrend 0.649226 0.0913348 7.11 0 0.470213 0.828239
Policy_Year 4.115446 0.9058423 4.54 0 2.340028 5.890864
posttime -0.38542 0.1091539 -3.53 0 -0.5993594 -0.171484
posttimepr~r -0.0806 0.0453172 -1.78 0.075 -0.169421 0.008219
_cons -15.5784 0.6253293 -24.91 0 -16.80402 -14.35277
Total_Enro~d (exposure)
/lnalpha 2.412674 0.089493 2.237271 2.588077
alpha 11.16377 0.9990794 9.367731 13.30416Wronski 39 
 
 
Table 12: Negative Binomial Regression for County Analysis Observing Autism Count Using 
High Provider Counties as Comparison Group 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
The state analysis was done to show whether the ASP had an impact on autism rates and my 
results show that it did not. These results were to be used in tandem with the county analysis to 
confirm an effect of the ASP on autism rates. While the OLS regressions show that the ASP 
might have had a positive impact on increasing autism rates in provider counties, the nbreg 
regression shows also with significance that a reduction in autism rates results from the presence 
of a provider in a county. These contradictory county analysis results, combined with non-
confirmational state analysis results, overall lead to a rejection of the hypothesis that programs 
which offer financial incentives for autism diagnoses increase autism rates. At best, even if we 
give precedence to the OLS results for the county analysis, we cannot make any statement about 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01)= 1.30E+04 Prob>=chibar2 = 0
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 1320
LR chi2(5) = 304.02
Dispersion     = mean Prob > chi2 = 0
Log likelihood = -1464.2616 Pseudo R2 = 0.094
Autism_Count Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
providerhigh 3.818563 0.5490005 6.96 0 2.742542 4.894585
timetrend 0.772515 0.1144596 6.75 0 0.5481784 0.996852
Policy_Year 5.23764 0.9800643 5.34 0 3.316749 7.158531
posttime -0.49688 0.1265204 -3.93 0 -0.7448561 -0.248905
posttimehigh -0.16435 0.0549714 -2.99 0.003 -0.2720963 -0.056612
_cons -16.6361 0.7586911 -21.93 0 -18.12311 -15.1491
Total_Enro~d (exposure)
/lnalpha 2.278508 0.0903779 2.10137 2.455645
alpha 9.762103 0.8822789 8.177368 11.65395
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01)= 9990.86 Prob>=chibar2 = 0Wronski 40 
 
the impact of the ASP on autism rates. Perhaps through these results, we can observe 
confirmation in the ability for markets to respond to changes in demand. This is to say that the 
opposing mechanism could be observed: providers observed that there was a need for services 
and that if they did not provide services, the existing autism-affected community would be 
underserved. Yet, because the autism count data was heavily over-dispersed, it is more likely that 
once county student population size is taken into account, there are actually reductions in autism 
counts among provider counties. One of the major limitations to this analysis that pre-policy 
provider counts were not able to be measured or observed in any way and the best indication of 
post-providers that we have is the number of providers in a county in 2006, even though the 
policy was active in 2004. In looking at post-2006 provider lists, we do know that the number of 
providers does change from year to year and can mean the difference between a county having a 
―high‖ level of providers (2 providers) and no providers. While all of this can be interpreted to 
mean that the Ohio Autism Scholarship program is not causing an increase in autism cases and, 
thus, avoids a potential misallocation of resources to children who are not truly autistic, this 
conclusion should be made cautiously. Several additional, and perhaps more important, 
limitations in this analysis prevent strong conclusions from being drawn. First, because data on 
the actual number of students using the scholarship in each county was not available, the 
measure of autism cases in counties is a crude proxy at best and does not directly measure the 
number of autism cases related to the policy. This analysis only assumes that the scholarship 
program might incentivize autism diagnoses but does not actually show that this happens by 
linking autism diagnoses with actual usage of the scholarship. Second, because the scholarship 
can be used anywhere in Ohio, the location where child lives (although the county where his/her 
autism case is documented) does not, in fact, entirely restrict provider usage. Although it was for Wronski 41 
 
this reason that the state analysis was also performed, this logistical issue does present problems 
in the analysis. I only have assumed that if no providers exist in an autistic child‘s home county, 
there is more difficulty in utilizing the ASP and thus less incentive to obtain an autism diagnosis 
in order to use it. We have no measure of parent‘s willingness levels to gain access to autism 
services and perception of what is and is not worth the incentive. Perhaps parents in non-provider 
counties would be willing to drive 1 or 2 hours to a provider county to access the policy. 
Unfortunately, a randomized quasi-experimental setup is not possible here. Nevertheless, this 
novel study makes an important contribution to the literature as it proposes a method for 
quantitatively evaluating the impact of financial incentive-diagnosis linked policies on autism 
diagnoses, or diagnoses for another condition, for that matter. Departments of Education 
responsible for overseeing such enacted policies should collect more complete data and make it 
accessible to researchers in order to perform better impact assessments and ensure that disability 
resources are being spent in an ethical and reasonable way. The ideal data set would contain the 
number of autism-diagnosed children in a county using the Ohio ASP. It would show on a 
person-by-person level where these children were living as well as where they were using the 
scholarship funding in order to show how influential the role provider proximity plays to 
program usage. It would also be interesting to know how much money each student is claiming 
from the scholarship each year and the composition of care they are using. An interesting 
question to explore would be whether the amount of care is affected by scholarship program 
usage. Are those receiving the financial incentives using more care than those not on the program 
or the same amount, just paying less? It might also be helpful to know about alternative forms of 
financial support utilized by the autistic child‘s family, such as Medicaid or private health 
insurance. As this analysis shows, there is a great degree of over-dispersion in the autism count Wronski 42 
 
and rate data. Clearly there is a need for more explanatory variables to be included that might 
explain the great deal of variance among autism counts and rates in the various state and county 
groups.    
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